

"ing" refs: Vienna
 Paris
 My CFR seminar
 — Crisis Pattern — F. MA.
 [Amalini
 Delegation]

- Milogon
- SSR - Aug 23, Sept 6
- Kilpatrick speech (FU) (Chagos) (Hans)
 my proposed message to K, by JFK on up!
 JFK July 25? speech

CHECK WITH RIKYNE !

- Effort of Kilpatrick — on limitation; desire to change "balance" (of FS)
- Aim of SU to match/equal US FS cap — here, inhibit
 US FU threat (e.g. on Berlin) (allow SU to offer no unilateral,
 as to China: to threaten SU 2nd-use, without so much fearing
 US escalation (but it triggers SU FS);
 ||| US FU threat rested on MONOPOLY OF FS/PREEMPTIVE THREAT,
 HENCE MONOPOLY OF THREAT TO ESCALATE.
 (Though, in '90's: superiority in FS that
 on our part " " "
 is a better basis for US than of FU or use
 there is absence of FS that of US
 we on either side
 or (want) SU monopoly of FS that
 (= US, 1955-64)
- deal with Berlin (inc. warnings) + election
- JFK renewing before Oct 15 (K anticipated, control on?)

Oct Planning } Eth JFK gave more credence to admitted to SSMs
→ PSALM } or (without explicitly SSMs, or his name) thought he would
mislead (as of Aug, Sept, Oct — a real week, in
without SSMs — as PDS judges, 9 Feb 89)

- ^{US}
- Improved relations w. Cuba (UN...)
- US "improving" of status (JFK - McN? — willing to withdraw)

1. Sows: a) to be cautious with US reaction
- NOT TO RELY ON LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON US! (Schulz RPR, 305)

b) Not to put MRBMs in NVN
(or Migs in Nicaragua)

c) Not to refrain from aid to DRV

- to refrain from putting SAMS, M. 30, in NVN

d) TO SEEK MILITARY PARITY (the hard way) in Nicaragua
BEFORE EXPECTING DIPLOMATIC PARITY

US
US:

11. Avoid brotherhood: nuclear crisis.

2. Not: Sows don't have total control over small allies.

- Not: (immediately): STOP MONGOOSE; give up (?) invasion thoughts.

3. Not: bring in real experts on local opponents: + Sows.

- McN Claim: McN's law (immediately): not true, from Cuba II (→ VN) 100

4. Sows always back down in end?

"During the service" (McN 52) - Justice, Simon

5. "Unilateral pressure" is best, + work; avoid "irreversible" action (Ball, 25)
(Blockade; \Rightarrow 34A, RT, troops ("not irreversible" 49

- "GOOD DOCTOR" TACTIC (if you expect to "deal" entirely) RNC - pg 28, 65!

6. 34A (= magover) is worth doing.

(for provocation?)

7. Avoid, if possible, invasion ^{or bombing} (NVN) that might bring
in SU or China. (not so much: that would fail)
as in Cuba

8. Not: be ready to make major concessions
rather than get in large, limited war

(Maybe: ... only to avoid war with SU or China).

- committing efforts of limited combat (RT, troops)

9. No lessons about: - actual combat of us. "McN's law")

- form of Cuba (VNM, Hanoi...)
to stimulate us

- restraint on small ally/China/Portugal

- CR, civil war, guerrilla war

- public support during long war

10. (LBJ, NOT N): Don't rely on FU threat.

0. Motives for US FS buildup; sel, US FO threats (Kilpatrick) X
(effect of Cuban defections on)

1. MongOOSE.

X (only cursory
discussion, by official
X (denial)
X (dry criticism (McN)
or upturn

Did SU foresee
a high risk
of this?

1A. JFK priority to Mongoose; ^{JFK} resolutions for invasion

2. Invasion planning: ^{spring '62}
Oct '62

WAS THERE AN
"INTENT" TO BOMB
CUBA, IN 1964?

TO INVADE CUBA
(? "NUH?")
SHOULD SU HAVE
FORESEEN THESE,
OR NOT?

3. Assass. efforts.

lack of belief (by McN, others) - ^{significant} change in strategic balance, or power

4. JFK willingness to trade

IRBMs. ("Munich" - as recalled to Stevenson).

5. RFK offer of private deal.

X (McN)

6. RFK Ultimate on IRBMs

^{Secret:} X (McN)
[For Brennan + McN: this was a bluff;
w/ 48 hrs.

7. RFK warning ^{new} on shootdown.

X (don't know,
focus on it)

8. Mongoose after Cuban II: - through March 63

- after " 63-Nov 63

- 1964

9. PEAUCH, + similar restrictions on decision.

X

14. Leves: What did K "learn" about JFK -- + USG - from Bay of Pigs? ^{winning!} Vain?
Wall? Kilpatrick? Berlin
Feb 25?

10. (Leves: What K planned for Berlin, Mongoose? X)
if missiles remained? What was his aim, needs, or thing?
also - (How was?)

11. Leves: What K would have done, on Berlin or Italy ^{not just, planned} X
if missiles struck; or if invasion.
SCHLES, RFK 512

US: What would
JFK have done -
if missiles not
decision, till
"operational"?

15. How certain was K that JFK would not discover? What did he think/hope/for
would break if he did?

12. Leves: What was nature of warnings + assess on
Berlin and on election; and timing of project
(w/ot election? To invasion from?) ^{WHY NOT SAY FIRST?}
(WHAT WAS RUSH?)

13. Leves: Did offer of a private deal on IRBMs have any effect
at the time? Help later? X

WHY WARHEADS
SENT?
45, 274-75

Shooting of ~~provision~~ of ~~provision~~
can of "
fake of "

(Cuba I; morgan; TG/34A/Phia; Mingo)

- ISN'T THIS
ALL BEING
DONE TO
NICARAGUA?
(Branch +
Cuba)
- Contra strategy (C) → cause civil uprising, revolt,
by harassing, sabotaging economy (get any to defect?
in C/A, Aug 62
Chile 1970-73; Kenya?
(Brazil?)
Mingo?)
not -
(see of 1961 deals with C/A, Tech Services?)
Boston/C/A, Oct 62

- US fear (SU hits?) of horizontal use
Cuba - Berlin
an SN/E

- Competition in machines

(see LBW/aiders; LBW/RFK; me to Hon. Graham;
McG's Tatters; McN to WDA demonstrators;
Van/VC, Kouton, 72; R. MA's; JFK/RFK/Contra

Branch-Aider
(RFK like R/North vs. Khaddafi or Ortega?!)

Branch +
Cuba, 61

- Did Castro exaggerate prob. of invasion; manipulate
Sovs, hoping into support & pledge, actually
into SSAs?

Grainelli + Jinn

- where did Keating get his estimate, Oct 10
Did JFK believe he had a Paper man, McLean,
who was forcing his hand?

Was this a hidden ~~element~~ in crisis?

How did JFK react?

(see survey of Fomin contact)

(Walter E. Blum, 1964)

- "First letter" on 26th, always described wrong;
2d, also, as "raising the ante". B+W, 255

- 256: were there 2 Dob/RFK talks: one in Embassy,
one in private?

- Role of emotion:

- F.M.A... misfit, etc.

- response to violent attack

370, B+W

- by Sauer (see SNIE; Mikoyan; JFK's est. of K)

- by JFK (to match recon plan)

- JFK

- Paris issue (B+W 257

rights

military Paris

dip. "

- Castro reactions (AA; ...)

(see B/W 259

see Castro/Marking

- What is the meaning of the Exister/Organ statement?

"New ^{approach} things" - post-nuclear (see Shokryanov,
B+W 259-60)

see Henthoff,

B+W 91

Sorenson, 93

- N: good vs. bad (Real War)

- our global responsibilities

obligations

commitments

^{and} states, concern

(result of: alliances

(Cuba; ME and / from
West Europe

on strength (referring)

(see K to JFK at Vina: ✓

"We have commitments."

Don't "misunderstand"

K: you have subtle ways of making things

NC

- our rights to think or imply ^{use} violence

(both are "uses" of violence)

(for "good," "we do," "threats," "commitments," "responsibilities")

(We did not ask to be watched at the
gate, but there is no one else")

NC

- right to role, effort

(There follows from use, and right to

use, mission force; it "corrupts"

"Travel" + "aid" ...

- right to Open Door - "level playing field"

(in others' countries:

at least / not ^{level} with other foreign

countries, but ^{not} with the

domestic firms there).

- Open Door wanted to US attacks, if necessary.

us. (Cuban Miss (1961), SSMs (SAMs) 1962

Neurological Miss, 1961 and other

- N: good vs. bad (Real War)

- our global responsibilities

obligations

commitments

^{and} states, concern

(result of: alliances

(Cuba; ME oil / Iran
West Europe

an strength (superiority))

(see K to JFK at Vina: ✓

"We have commitments."

Don't "mischaracterize"

K: you have subtle ways of making things

NC

- our rights to thinks or implicit ^{use} violence

(both are "uses" of violence)

(for "good," "we def," "threats," "commitments," "responsibilities")

(We did not ask to be watched at the
gates, but there is no one else")

NC

- right to role, effort

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us. (Cuban Miss (1961), SSMs (SAMs) 1962

Neurological Miss, 1961 and not detected